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CACOPHONY OR CONCERTO?: ANALYZING
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WIRETAP ACT’S
PARTY EXCEPTION FOR DUPLICATE GET
REQUESTS
David Koenig*
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“Wiretap Act”) prohibits
the intentional interception of an electronic communication. However,
“parties to a communication” can intercept a communication without
Wiretap Act liability. Parties include the intended recipients of a
communication.
When internet users navigate the internet, they
communicate with websites using GET requests. The users’ GET requests
call out to websites and websites respond by providing the websites’ content
to the users. During this process, websites receive user data. This data can
include information about the website visited, the search terms used to locate
the website, and referral data identifying the last web page the users visited.
Digital advertisers may populate websites users visit with advertisements
or plug-ins that allow users to “like” content. In doing so, advertisers
generate secondary GET requests between users and advertisers. Secondary
GET requests are duplicates of the GET requests between users and websites
insofar as they share user data. Advertisers retain and identify this data.
In the Third and Ninth Circuits, internet users argued that digital
advertisers used the duplicate GET requests to intercept user data contained
in the GET requests between users and websites—arguably a violation of
federal law under the Wiretap Act. Digital advertisers invoked the party
exception, arguing that advertisers were parties to the duplicate GET request
between internet users and advertisers. If so, the advertisers would be
parties to the user data received in the duplicate GET requests and exempt
from Wiretap Act liability. The Third Circuit held that the party exception
applied to the advertisers’ duplicate GET requests. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this approach and held that the party exception did not apply.
This Note argues that digital advertisers are unintended recipients that are
ineligible for the party exception. First, transmitting duplicate user data via
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a second communication is an effective—and sometimes necessary—method
of interception for electronic communications on the internet. In that case,
duplicate GET requests may indicate interception. This requires courts to
analyze shared data, not individual GET requests. Second, equating a direct
recipient of a duplicate GET request with an intended recipient lacks judicial
support and cannot properly decide party status. Third, users enter URLs or
click hyperlinks to navigate the internet. This identifies the websites that
users visit as the intended recipients of user data, not digital advertisers. As
such, advertisers are best categorized as unintended recipients and therefore
ineligible for the Wiretap Act’s party exception.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, one of the first digital advertisements appeared on the internet.1
Since then, digital advertisers have tailored digital advertising to internet
users’ individual identities.2 This process requires vast amounts of user data;
data brokers collect thousands of data points on millions of consumers.3 That
user data can be used to tailor digital advertising “based on everything from
users’ sexual orientations to their moods.”4 The user data necessary for
tailored digital advertising has been allegedly collected from emails,5 the
mobile applications that children use,6 and household appliances like smart
televisions.7

1. What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr [https://perma.cc/6DJ9-GMZC] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
2. Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, These Ads Think They Know You, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/30/opinion/privacy-targetedadvertising.html [https://perma.cc/DW6T-YHU3].
3. See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giantof-consumer-database-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/67SF-PKTN] (“Acxiom maintains
its own database on about 190 million individuals and 126 million households in the United
States.”).
4. Gilad Edelman, Why Don’t We Just Ban Targeted Advertising?, WIRED (Mar. 22,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-dont-we-just-ban-targeted-advertising
[https://perma.cc/M6PY-5FQY].
5. Claire Cain Miller, Google Accused of Wiretapping in Gmail Scans, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/technology/google-accused-ofwiretapping-in-gmail-scans.html [https://perma.cc/T9HG-L94K].
6. McDonald v. Kiloo APS, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1029–30 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (describing
allegations that the defendants tracked and collected children’s personal data from mobile
devices).
7. In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
(“Plaintiffs allege that, unbeknownst to them, Vizio’s Smart TVs . . . collect and report
consumers’ content viewing histories.”).
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The process of collecting user data can begin with something as simple as
an internet user browsing the internet.8 In its essential form, the internet is
built on a series of technical conversations.9 A typical internet user accesses
internet shopping, social media, news, and a myriad of digital content by
visiting websites served to a user via GET requests.10
The GET request is a digital call and response; an internet user’s web
browser calls out to the user’s intended destination—a particular website.11
The website responds to the user’s GET request by displaying the website’s
content.12 The user and website communicate digitally and, in the process,
exchange data.13
For example, a user visits The New York Times online.14 The user enters
The New York Times’s URL into a web browser.15 This generates a GET
request that is sent to The New York Times.16 The New York Times responds
by providing access to the website.17
At the same time, additional conversations can be created because of the
code that Facebook, Google, and other digital advertisers embed in the
websites that users visit.18 The code creates a secondary GET request
directing a user’s web browser to contact the digital advertisers.19 Notably,
this secondary GET request (“duplicate GET request”) is a duplicate of the
first GET request insofar as the secondary request shares user data with the

8. Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Demystifying Clickstream Data: A European and
U.S. Perspective, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563, 565–66 (2006) (describing user data collected
by visiting websites).
9. Notwithstanding this Note’s simplification, accessing a website is more complicated.
The process may generate forty-eight technical inquiries. Dan Luu, What Happens When You
Load a URL?, https://www.danluu.com/navigate-url [https://perma.cc/G64R-9BJ6]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
10. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (“When a
person uses a web browser to access a website, the browser sends a ‘GET’ request to the
server.”).
11. See
generally
Client-Server
Overview,
MDN
WEB
DOCS,
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Server-side/First_steps/ClientServer_overview [https://perma.cc/8WVR-J7Z9] (last visited Sept.17, 2021) (“You can make
a simple GET request by clicking on a link . . . . [The response] contains the actual [website]
HTML returned by the request.”).
12. Id.
13. See Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018) (finding identifiable data in URLs); see also infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text
(outlining the identifiable data in GET requests, including the aforementioned URLs).
14. Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (explaining
step-by-step how a user would access nytimes.com via a GET request sent between a user and
the website).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that Facebook embeds a “like” button containing Facebook code on affiliated
websites).
19. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (explaining that the initial communication between
a user and a website can generate an additional communication used to contact a digital
advertiser).
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first request.20 This duplicate GET request not only delivers digital
advertisements but also transmits the duplicate user data to the advertisers.21
In the example, The New York Times responds to a user’s original GET
request with access to its homepage, and an advertiser’s embedded code also
directs a user’s web browser to contact advertisers using a duplicate GET
request.22 The digital advertisers fill advertising space on The New York
Times’s website.23 This duplicate GET request calls out to advertisers and
the advertisers respond by serving digital advertisements.24
For an advertiser, user data is important because it can be monetized.25
The duplicate GET request transmits the URL a user entered.26 This
identifies users’ web browsing histories.27 A duplicate GET request can also
include user data identifying the search terms a user queried in order to locate
the website28 or referral information identifying the last webpage a user
visited.29 Because duplicate GET requests contain the same user data as the
GET request between users and websites, advertisers can see user data they

20. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (“Facebook’s code directs the user’s browser to
copy the referer [sic] header from the GET request and then send a separate but identical GET
request and its associated referer [sic] header to Facebook’s server.”); see also Brown v.
Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021)
(referring to these secondary GET requests as “duplicate GET requests” and noting that In re
Facebook and In re Google also included duplicate GET requests).
21. Id. at 596.
22. See Russell A. Miller, The Legal Fate of Internet Ad-Blocking, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 299, 313 (2018) (“The user’s browser responds to these secondary get-requests by calling
for . . . subsidiary content, such as advertising.”); Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
23. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
24. Id. (“This communication instructs Avenue A’s server to send the computer a banner
advertisement to fill the blank space on the nytimes.com home page.”).
25. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting
that data powers “trackers, cookies, and algorithms designed to capture and monetize the
information”).
26. See Orin Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/websurfing-andthe-wiretap-act [https://perma.cc/U9J4-NBT6] (providing legal commentary on pending GET
request litigation and considering the Wiretap Act implications—if any—of a technical
process that concededly leads to the “disclosure of URLs to . . . third party sites.”).
27. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
URLs reveals users’ internet activity).
28. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018) (“[I]f a user searches for ‘The Few, The Proud’ on Google, the resulting URL contains
‘the+few+the+proud’ . . . .”); Client-Server Overview, supra note 11 (providing an illustrative
GET request that includes queried search terms “client+server+overview” within the GET
request).
29. Burak Guzel, HTTP Headers for Dummies, ENVATOTUTS+ (May 12, 2021),
https://code.tutsplus.com/tutorials/http-headers-for-dummies--net-8039
[https://perma.cc/6AFS-63WS] (“The remainder of the request contains . . . various
information about the . . . request . . . . [I]f there was a referring [URL], that would have been
in the [request] too.”).
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might not otherwise have access to.30 Advertisers can store and identify this
duplicate user data.31
Internet users argue that the code generating a duplicate GET request
intercepts communications between internet users and the websites that the
internet users visit.32 This redirects a cacophony of user data to the
advertisers.33 Advertisers respond that the internet users’ GET requests sent
to websites generate a concerto of exempt GET requests intended for the
digital advertisers.34 These additional GET requests are necessary in order
to assemble websites built on the advertisers’ content.35
If internet users are correct, digital advertisers may have accessed a
communication between users and websites as an eavesdropper.36 If that is
so, advertisers are one step closer to wiretap liability.37 If advertisers are
correct, a duplicate GET request creates an entirely new communication
between users and advertisers.38 As a consequence, the new communication
would be exempt and the duplicate user data legally insignificant.39
From a statutory perspective, internet users and advertisers disagree about
whether the Wiretap Act’s party exception should apply to the duplicate GET
requests that the digital advertisers generate.40 According to the Wiretap
Act’s party exception, eavesdroppers are liable for interception while parties
to a communication are not.41 Circuit courts disagree regarding whether the

30. Id.; see also Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511 n.6 (“[Capturing] URLs would also divulge
the particular articles . . . viewed.”); In re Application of U.S. for A Pen Reg., 396 F. Supp.
2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005).
31. In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(establishing that cookies can retain GET data).
32. See generally Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 44–48, In re Facebook, Inc. Internet
Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-17486), 2018 WL 313496, at *44–48
(arguing in favor of a prima facie claim of unlawful wiretap interception in GET litigation).
33. See id.
34. Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Google, Inc. at 5–6, In re Google Inc. Cookie
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-4300), 2014 WL
1413954, at *5–6. (“[S]ending of [information contained within a GET request] is inherent to
the Internet browsing process . . . .”).
35. Websites are assembled from content found elsewhere on the internet; GET requests
assemble the content in one place. Id.
36. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020)
(reserving judgment on the other elements of a successful wiretap claim but declining to
exempt the defendant from interception liability as a matter of law).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (prohibiting the intentional interception of “any . . .
electronic communication”).
38. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir.
2015) (finding that an intended recipient of a duplicate communication becomes a party to that
communication and cannot be liable for a Wiretap Act violation).
39. Id.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 143 (assessing whether the
Wiretap Act’s party exception applies where a defendant allegedly intercepted data via GET
request).
41. Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding wiretap interception
liability for eavesdroppers but not for parties); In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (confirming
that Warden properly interprets party exception applicability to eavesdroppers in the context
of federal law because the state exception in Warden is equivalent to the federal exception).
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party exception applies to duplicate GET requests.42 Advertisers and users
are left asking if duplicate GET requests are evidence of unlawful
interception or legally exempt.43
This Note focuses on the party exception to the Wiretap Act44 and analyzes
whether a digital advertiser who receives a duplicate GET request containing
the same data as another GET request is potentially liable under the Wiretap
Act or legally exempt under the Wiretap Act’s statutory party exception.45
Part I examines the emergence of wiretap surveillance, the legislative
history of federal wiretap protections, and the extension of those protections
to electronic communications. Part I further considers a prima facie Wiretap
Act claim and the statutory liability exceptions available to wiretap
defendants.
Part II provides an in-depth analysis of the party exception to the Wiretap
Act. It describes a typical party analysis by identifying two paths to party
status—affirmative acts and recipient status. It also considers two other
factors that can influence a typical party analysis—a recipient’s behavior and
how a court defines the scope of a protected communication.
Part III examines the circuit split on duplicate GET requests and the party
exception. First, it considers the Third Circuit’s decision concluding that the
party exception applied. Then, it highlights First and Seventh Circuit
decisions that established doctrine for a contrary approach. Finally, it
reviews the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of duplicate GET requests in a decision
in which the court held that the party exception did not apply.
Part IV contends that advertisers that receive duplicate GET requests are
ineligible for the party exception. It argues that when a duplicate GET
request contains the same user data as another GET request, the shared data
should be the focus of a court’s party analysis. Then, Part IV suggests that
direct receipt of a GET request cannot properly decide party status. Part IV
concludes that when a duplicate GET request’s data is analyzed, advertisers
are ineligible for a party exception.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WIRETAPPING AND WIRETAP PROTECTIONS
Part I.A details the origins of wiretapping and the legislative response
prohibiting the practice of wiretapping. Part I.B examines the extension of
wiretap protections to electronic communications. Part I.C identifies the
statutory elements of a wiretap violation. Part I.D highlights statutory
exceptions to wiretap liability, including the party exception.
42. Compare In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir.
2020) (finding that the party exception did not apply to GET request litigation), with In re
Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 145 (finding the party exception did apply). See generally Brianna
Vollman, Cookie Monster: Facebook Sued Under Wiretap Act, U. CIN. L. REV. (June 2,
2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/06/02/cookie-monster-facebook-sued-under-wiretap-act
[https://perma.cc/3UKJ-3B7P] (outlining the circuit split regarding GET request litigation
detailed in this Note).
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
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A. Emergence of Wiretapping and the Legislative Response
When the telegraph was invented in 1844, it allowed parties to send and
receive messages across long distances.46 Soon thereafter, telegrams were
routinely intercepted by splicing telegraph wires and intercepting the
messages contained within.47
State law enforcement began wiretapping telegrams and telephones in
order to aid in criminal investigations; the process of intercepting these
communications became a useful alternative to paying criminal informants.48
By 1938, government and private wiretapping had proliferated, and public
outcry had grown, but federal law did not prohibit wiretap interception.49 In
these early days of wiretap interception, disclosing information obtained by
wiretap was prohibited, but wiretap interception itself was not.50 The U.S.
Supreme Court clarified the legality of wiretapping in Katz v. United States.51
Katz prohibited government wiretaps when the wiretap would violate Fourth
Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures.52
In quick order, Congress enacted the first substantive federal protections
against private wiretapping in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196853 (“Omnibus Act”). In addition to outlining procedures for
government wiretapping that complied with the Katz ruling, the Omnibus Act
prohibited private actors from intercepting “any wire . . . communication.”54
The Omnibus Act treated private surveillance differently than government
surveillance and found that private surveillance had “little [legal]
justification.”55 Accordingly, the Omnibus Act implemented a “blanket
prohibition” outlawing private wiretapping—thus protecting wire and oral
communications.56

46. Alex Markels, Timeline: Wiretaps’ Use and Abuse, NPR (Dec. 20, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5061834
[https://perma.cc/3H43VXLD].
47. Hereinafter, “wiretapping” is used to refer to the process of interception. Michael
Pollak, A Short History of Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/nyregion/a-short-history-of-wiretapping.html
[https://perma.cc/E36D-29QD] (describing the interception of telegrams by wiretap).
48. Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, NEW YORKER (June 18, 1938),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1938/06/18/tapping-the-wires
[https://perma.cc/7S8E-PS2Q].
49. Id. (“[L]awyers . . . have worked hard for federal legislation against wire-tapping, but
their efforts have always failed.”).
50. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605) (prohibiting the disclosure of wiretapped
communications).
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. See id. at 353.
53. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
54. Id. § 2511, 82 Stat. at 213.
55. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968) (“Virtually all concede that the use of
wiretapping . . . by private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications
are intercepted without the consent of one of the participants.”).
56. Id. at 91.

2021]

CACOPHONY OR CONCERTO?

959

That said, the “blanket prohibition” included caveats. The Omnibus Act
introduced important statutory exceptions—including the party exception—
that remain in effect today.57 The party exception provided that, “[i]t shall
not be unlawful . . . for a person . . . to intercept a wire or oral communication
where such person is a party to the communication.”58
B. Updating Wiretap Protections for Modern Technologies
Despite these newfound statutory protections, the Omnibus Act did not
account for the development of technologies that changed how people
communicate with one another. The Omnibus Act was concerned with oral
conversations that were intercepted using recording devices59 and oftentimes
transmitted greater distances using telephone lines60 and via radio
communications.61 By 1986, new technology enabled wireless telephone
conversations via cellular technology and non-oral electronic communication
via the internet’s transmission of data.62 The fledgling internet allowed
companies to transmit company data digitally and enabled individuals to
communicate using email.63 Neither form of communication was protected
by existing federal law.64
Acknowledging this gap in federal wiretap protections, Congress enacted
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act65 (“Wiretap Act”). The Wiretap
Act amended the Omnibus Act to clarify and expand “privacy protections
and standards” by addressing modern technologies.66 The Wiretap Act
included federal protections for electronic communications.67 The party
exception reappeared in the Wiretap Act. Intercepting an “electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication” was
legally exempt according to the Wiretap Act.68 The Wiretap Act’s legislative

57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
58. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511, 82 Stat.
197, 214.
59. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 94–95 (detailing congressional concern with disguised devices
used to intercept oral communications).
60. Id. at 92 (highlighting the statute’s prohibition of wiretap interception leveraging the
use of telephone line surveillance).
61. Id. (detailing the statute’s equivalent prohibition of wiretap interception leveraging
the use of radio communications).
62. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (“Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations,
computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices,
and video teleconferencing.”).
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 5 (conceding that no federal law protected modern telecommunications like the
internet from wiretap interception).
65. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
66. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see also In re Matter of Search Warrant for [redacted].com,
248 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (surveying the legislative purpose of the Wiretap
Act).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 85 (1986).
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history reveals that Congress remained concerned with unauthorized private
persons accessing “communications to which they were not a party.”69
C. Outlining a Prima Facie Wiretap Act Claim
This Note analyzes whether the Wiretap Act’s party exception applies to a
duplicate GET request received by advertisers when that duplicate request
shares data with GET request sent between users and websites.70 For clarity,
this Note first considers the elements of a prima facie Wiretap Act claim.
The Wiretap Act prohibits the intentional interception of an electronic
communication.71 In order to plead a successful wiretap claim, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted . . . (3) the
contents of (4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.”72
Interception is intentional when the defendant had knowledge of the
interception or it was the defendant’s conscious objective to intercept the
communication.73 Interception is unintentional when the defendant
intercepts a communication by mistake or by accident.74 The circuit split
discussed in this Note addresses digital advertisers allegedly embedding code
on websites; that code ultimately generates the duplicate GET requests.75
This indicates intentional conduct, whether or not wiretap liability exists.
Interception also requires the acquisition of a communication’s contents.76
Content is defined as the “information concerning the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication.”77 Acquiring a GET request can meet this
requirement when it contains URL data identifying a user’s queried search
terms78 or the particular web page users visit.79

69. Id. at 19.
70. See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
72. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019).
73. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (“An ‘intentional’ state of
mind . . . [can mean] the result of one’s conduct if such conduct or result is one’s conscious
objective.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986))); Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that Apple’s knowledge qualified as intent).
74. Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1044 (“Interceptions that are the product of inadvertence
or mistake are insufficient . . . .”).
75. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“Facebook facilitated [the tracking of users] by embedding third-party plug-ins on . . . web
pages.).
76. Zak v. Bose Corp., No. 17-CV-02928, 2020 WL 2762552, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 27,
2020) (outlining prima facie elements).
77. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boonstra, 302 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)).
78. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 139 (3d
Cir. 2015) (considering the content element in GET request litigation and concluding “we are
persuaded that—at a minimum—some queried URLs qualify”).
79. Id. at 138; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A
URL . . . identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus
reveals much more information about the person’s Internet activity.”); see supra notes 26–29
and accompanying text (confirming that GET requests can contain these URLs).
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An “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system.”80 The data exchanged between users and websites qualifies.81 The
Third and Ninth Circuits did not question a GET request’s status as an
electronic communication.82 Accordingly, this Note does not question a
GET request’s status as an electronic communication.
Finally, a communication must be intercepted using “a device.”83 The
Third Circuit was unable to identify a device that could intercept the user
data of a GET request sent between users and websites.84 Other courts
recognize that the device is a second communication that contains duplicate
data or—at a minimum—that the web servers facilitating a second
communication qualify as the device.85 This Note agrees: a duplicate GET
request powered by the defendant’s web servers is the device.86
D. Statutory Exceptions to Wiretap Act Liability
A prima facie wiretap claim must also account for the Wiretap Act’s
statutory exceptions. This includes exceptions for law enforcement87 and
interception as an incident in the ordinary course of business.88 Notably,
consent to interception can exempt the accused from liability.89 If an internet
user communicates with a website and the website consents to an advertiser
intercepting the communication, an advertiser is free from liability.90 For
that reason, consent can exempt an advertiser from liability.91

80. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
81. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. See generally In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir.
2020); In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d 125.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
84. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 141–42.
85. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that Pharmatrak
relied on devices such as its web servers to capture information from users.”); see also Vasil
v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (concluding that
the defendant has employed an “artifice” to receive the allegedly intercepted
communications).
86. See infra Part IV.A.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
88. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i). Incidentally, a federal district court in the Northern District of
California rejected an ordinary course of business exception for a wiretap claim involving
GET requests. Brown v. Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *15 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 12, 2021) (“Sending a duplicate GET request to Google neither facilitates nor is
incidental [to] the communication that Plaintiffs allege was intercepted—in this case, the
communication between the user’s computer and the website.”).
89. In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19–20.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent . . . unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act . . . .”).
91. See generally In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(exempting liability with consent).
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Consent is not foolproof. An eavesdropper may fail to get consent from
the websites that users visit.92 If an eavesdropper asks for consent, they may
fail to adequately disclose the extent of data collection, rendering consent
invalid.93 Each statutory exception is analyzed on its own merit.94 Circuit
courts still disagree on whether the party exception applies to duplicate GET
requests.95 As a result, party exception applicability remains relevant and is
thus this Note’s focus. According to that exception, a person who intercepts
an “electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication” is exempt from Wiretap Act liability as a matter of law.96
II. NAVIGATING THE WIRETAP ACT’S PARTY EXCEPTION ANALYSIS
Part II outlines how courts conduct a party exception analysis. Part II.A
identifies two ways a defendant can become an exempt party. This includes
affirmative acts in Part II.A.1 or recipient status in Part II.A.2. Part II.B
distinguishes between intended and unintended recipients using two
analytical methods. Part II.B.1 analyzes manifestations of sender intent. Part
II.B.2 analyzes a communication’s intended destination. Part II.C highlights
how a recipient’s behavior can also distinguish between intended and
unintended recipients. This recipient behavior includes manufactured
recipients, discussed in Part II.C.1, and surreptitious listeners, discussed in
Part II.C.2. Part II.D examines how the scope of a communication affects
party status.
A. Identifying Parties: Affirmative Acts and Recipients
The parties to a communication are exempt from liability under the
Wiretap Act.97 Digital advertisers can become an exempt party through
affirmative acts98 or recipient status.99
1. Path One: Affirmative Acts May Indicate Party Status
The Second Circuit held in Caro v. Weintraub100 that a defendant’s
affirmative acts can grant exempt party status under the Wiretap Act.101

92. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 20.
93. Brown v. Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
12, 2021) (“[E]ven assuming that Google has established that websites generally consented to
the interception of their communications with users, Google does not demonstrate that
websites consented to . . . interception of communications with users who were in private
browsing mode.”).
94. See Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1376–77 (D. Kan. 1996)
(analyzing two statutory exceptions distinctly).
95. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
97. Id. (“It shall not be unlawful . . . where such person is a party to the
communication . . . .”).
98. See infra Part II.A.1.
99. See infra Part II.A.2.
100. 618 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
101. See id. at 97–98.

2021]

CACOPHONY OR CONCERTO?

963

Caro involved a conversation across a kitchen table.102 The defendant
engaged in conversation and recorded the exchange with his phone.103 The
Caro court had to decide whether the recording was wiretap interception or
exempt because the defendant was a party to the conversation.104
In order to identify the parties, the court in Caro analyzed the defendant’s
behavior. The court held that the defendant was a party because of his
affirmative acts: namely, participation in the conversation.105 By
participating in the conversation, the defendant was deemed an exempt
party.106 This is consistent with the legislative history for wiretap laws.107
By this metric, participation can accord exempt party status.108
The reach of affirmative acts extends well beyond the kitchen table. In
Zak v. Bose,109 the court considered a mobile application that allowed users
to play music and view information about the users’ selected songs.110 By
design, the Bose application responded to users’ song requests in order to
play the songs and display the information expected.111 In Zak, active
participation became the cornerstone of a party status analysis.112 By virtue
of the Bose application’s functionality, the court concluded that Bose was a
“known participant” in the communication, and this established Bose as an
exempt party.113
Participation in a communication may also be framed in terms of sender
and recipient.114 In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz,115 the Seventh Circuit
analyzed email transmissions by describing the movement of email
communications as those that were sent from “sender to recipient.”116 This
terminology enabled the court to conclude, on other grounds, that the
defendant was best characterized as neither. Instead, the defendant was a

102. Id. at 96.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 97–98 (reviewing de novo the district court’s ruling that the defendant was a
party to the conversation at issue).
105. Id. at 98 (noting that the defendant “spoke up a few times urging [Caro] to continue”
and determining that “[t]hose facts [we]re sufficient to establish that David was a party to the
conversation”).
106. Id. at 97 (“[A] party to the conversation is one who takes part in the
conversation . . . .”).
107. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 94 (1968) (“‘[P]arty’ would mean the person actually
participating in the communication.”).
108. See id.
109. No. 17-CV-02928, 2019 WL 1437909 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *3 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a participant in the
conversation, as opposed to a non-participant that uses other means to gain access . . . .”).
113. Id. at *3–4. (finding that receiving and displaying user media was the primary function
of the application and this established that the defendant was eligible for party status).
114. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125,
143 (3d Cir. 2015) (supporting this framework by identifying paradigmatic parties as “the
speaker and/or sender, and at least one intended recipient”).
115. 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010).
116. Id. at 705 (analyzing defendant’s defense on other grounds by framing a
communication as between a sender and a recipient).
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“spy,” who accessed “nonpublic” emails and was thus subject to the Wiretap
Act’s unlawful interception liability.117
2. Path Two: Recipients May Qualify for Party Status
The Szymuszkiewicz analysis identified two parties to a communication:
the sender and the recipient of an email.118 Recipient status is the second
path to becoming a party. In this view, a party also includes the person to
whom, or the entity at which, a conversation is directed.119 Protected
communications will always include at least one sender and one recipient.120
Without at least one identifiable sender and recipient, there might not be a
protected communication at all.121
People v. Herrington,122 an Illinois state court case, is illustrative in this
regard: in a simple conversation, words are spoken by one person and
directed toward another.123 Herrington held that the person on the receiving
end of a conversation can record without liability.124 For example, an
internet user might visit The New York Times’s online website.125 Via
transmission of electronic data, the internet user’s computer is speaking and
directing this conversation to the website.126 Thus, the website becomes an
exempt party because the website is the recipient of the user’s
communication.127
In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation128 and Allen v. Quicken
Loans Inc.129 confirm that in the sphere of electronic communications, the
websites that users intend to communicate with are prime examples of
exempt recipients. By navigating to the Nickelodeon website owned by

117. See id. at 705, 707 (implying that the defendant qualifies as neither sender nor
recipient by straying from the sender and recipient terminology to label the defendant as a
“spy” and concluding that the defendant had accessed “nonpublic” emails).
118. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
119. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958–59 (Ill. 1994).
120. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir.
2015) (concluding that a communication will always include at least one sender and one
recipient).
121. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *6 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (noting that if a plaintiff cannot identify an alleged communication’s
recipient, then no communication exists at all for Wiretap Act protection).
122. 645 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 1994).
123. See id. at 958–59; see also Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018) (affirming that Herrington’s Illinois state law interpretation of
party status “comports with the meaning of party under the Wiretap Act” and with the Third
Circuit’s interpretation.).
124. Id. at 959 (holding that a party can record a conversation where the recording was of
a conversation the party would otherwise hear by virtue of having the conversation at all).
125. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
127. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that the websites users visit are parties to the digital communications sent from these
users).
128. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).
129. No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018).
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Viacom, users made Viacom a party to the electronic communication.130
Likewise, the plaintiff in Allen admitted that an allegedly intercepted
electronic communication took place on Quicken’s website; this admission
established that Quicken was a party to the communication.131
In sum, defendants can claim party status via affirmative acts including
participation as the sender or recipient of a communication.132 Claiming
recipient status may be the preferred path for digital advertisers generating
duplicate GET requests and directing this data toward themselves.133
Advertisers may argue that they are the recipients of users’ GET requests and
recipients are exempt parties per the party exception.134
B. Distinguishing Between Intended and Unintended Recipients
However, not all recipients qualify as parties. Intended recipients qualify
for party status, but unintended recipients do not.135 Therefore, it becomes
important to determine whether digital advertisers are intended or unintended
recipients.136
The person someone intends to talk to is an intended recipient.137 A
mobile application a user intends to engage with qualifies, too.138 So do the
websites a user intends to visit.139 Despite the various examples of intended
recipients, courts may disagree over how to identify an intended recipient.
Some courts focus on manifestations of sender intent.140 Other courts ask
whether a communication reached its intended destination.141 Part IV

130. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer, 827 F.3d at 267, 274 (establishing that the
communications occurred on “Viacom’s websites” and then deciding outright that Viacom
was a party).
131. See Allen, 2018 WL 5874088, at *4 (“[A]ll relevant communications occurred on
Quicken’s Website, making Quicken the intended recipient (and a party) to the
communications.”).
132. See Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Allen, 2018 WL
5874088, at *4 (agreeing that defendants were eligible for a party exception).
133. See Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5–6, In re Google Inc. Cookie
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-4300), 2014 WL
1413954, *5–6.
134. Id. at *35–36.
135. Compare Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that the defendant was a party to the communication because it “merely
received the information transferred to it”), with Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033,
1042–43 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying a motion to dismiss where a complaint alleged messages
were not addressed to Apple).
136. Compare In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020),
with In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).
137. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 1994) (quoting Bender v. Board
of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 539 N.E. 2d 234, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (affirming that when a
statement is “made or directed” toward someone, that person becomes an exempt party).
138. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
139. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(concluding, as a preliminary matter, that the websites associated with an advertiser are parties
to a communication capable of consenting to advertiser interception).
140. See infra notes 142–57, 170–73 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 158–69 and accompanying text.
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analyzes data in an advertiser’s duplicate GET request using both
approaches, so both approaches are considered here.
1. Analyzing Manifestations of Sender Intent
A federal district court in the Northern District of Illinois, in Vasil v. Kiip,
Inc.,142 identified the intended recipient by crediting manifestations of sender
intent on a motion to dismiss. While the Vasil federal wiretap claim failed
on other grounds, the recipient analysis was applied to an Illinois state law
claim that defined parties identically to the federal Wiretap Act’s definition
of an exempt party.143 The court asked who the sender of a communication
intended to communicate with—if anyone—and then asked if that
plaintiff-sender intent included the defendant.144 At the dismissal stage, it
was enough that the plaintiff-senders of the communication alleged that they
intended to communicate with no one at all.145 Hence, the senders could not
have intended to communicate with Vasil’s defendant, and party status
failed.146
Likewise, in Backhaut v. Apple,147 a federal district court in the Northern
District of California found it telling that the senders’ intended recipients
were clearly identified.148 Senders addressed text messages to particular
recipients, none of whom included Apple.149 In Lopez v. Apple, Inc.,150 the
court, also in the Northern District of California, considered whether Apple
was an intended recipient of users’ audio communications.151 Allegedly,
user audio was inadvertently sent to Apple via Apple’s Siri virtual
assistant.152 Though the claim failed on other grounds, the court, by
assessing the senders’ manifestations of intent, rejected Apple’s defense that
it was an exempt intended recipient.153
First, on a motion to dismiss, the court credited users’ allegations that they
did not intend to communicate with Apple.154 Second, the court inferred the
senders’ intent: conversations between users and their doctors, business
142. No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018).
143. Id. at *6. (defining parties under Illinois state law to match the definition as it appears
within the Wiretap Act).
144. See id.
145. See id. (“[P]laintiffs never intended, the complaint alleges, to communicate
information to Kiip (or anyone else) when not using the Runkeeper app, so Kiip could not
have been a party to a communication of data . . . that Kiip engineered . . . .”).
146. See id.
147. 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
148. See id. at 1043 (crediting plaintiff’s allegation that text messages “not addressed or
directed to Apple” was sufficient for a viable wiretap claim on a motion to dismiss).
149. Id.
150. No. 19-04577, 2021 WL 823122 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021).
151. Id. at *4 (“Apple argues . . . that it has not ‘intercepted’ communications because it
was the intended recipient.”).
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *4–5.
154. Id. at *4 (“Plaintiffs allege that they did not intend Apple to receive their private
communications, but that Apple ‘captured’ such communications using the software in their
devices. That sufficiently alleges interception.”).
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associates, and sexual partners were intended for “doctors, business partners
and sexual partners respectively—not Apple.”155
In Vasil, Backhaut, and Lopez, the courts declined to extend intended
recipient status to defendants where the senders of the communications did
not intend for the defendants to receive the allegedly intercepted
communications.156 At the dismissal stage, alleged sender intent was enough
to defeat party status.157
2. Analyzing a Communication’s Intended Destination
In contrast, other courts focus on a communication’s intended
destination.158 In the Seventh Circuit’s influential United States v. Pasha159
decision, callers intended to communicate with the criminal defendants by
dialing a particular telephone.160 The phone call reached the telephone, but
law enforcement—not the criminal defendants—answered the call.161 The
court held that law enforcement had not tampered with the underlying
communication because the call reached its intended destination: the
telephone.162 Law enforcement must tamper with a call on its way to an
intended telephone in order to become an unintended recipient liable for
interception.163
In Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc.,164 an Eastern District of Montana case,
Plaintiff Jurgens admitted that an electronic communication was stored on a
computer waiting to be transmitted to the defendant’s server.165 The court
held that the defendant must be an intended recipient.166 It did not matter
whether Jurgens intended to actually transmit the communication.167
According to Pasha, a court should reject liability where defendants merely

155. Id.
156. Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (finding no support for the defendant’s argument that
“a direct, but unintended, recipient of a communication automatically becomes a party”);
Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 (finding plaintiffs had alleged a prima facie claim because
messages were not addressed to defendant).
157. See supra notes 142–56 and accompanying text.
158. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 197–98 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting State v.
Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 26 (N.J. 1962)).
159. 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964).
160. See id. at 196–98.
161. See id. at 196.
162. See id. at 198 (“[T]he conversations between the callers and the agent cannot be said
to have been intercepted. Interception connotes a situation in which by surreptitious means a
third party overhears a telephone conversation . . . .”).
163. See Carbone, 183 A.2d at 4–5.
164. No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017).
165. See id. at *5 (highlighting plaintiff’s admission that the communication at issue was
for the “eventual ‘transmittal to Defendant’” (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 5,
Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00783 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017))).
166. See id. (concluding that said admission ended liability because an “intended recipient
of such transmission is a party”).
167. See id.
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answer a telephone168 rather than tamper with a communication on the way
to its intended destination.169
In State v. Roden,170 Washington state’s supreme court considered the
Pasha approach and offered a persuasive rebuttal to Pasha in modern times.
Roden declined to extend the intended destination approach to text
messages.171 According to Roden, text messages are similar to physical mail
where the mail’s addressee is clearly identifiable.172 The sender of a text
message has an expectation that the text message will reach an intended
destination which includes an intended recipient.173 Like Vasil and
Backhaut, the intended-recipient status hinged on an identifiable intended
recipient—not the destination alone.174
C. Recipient Behavior May Also Affect Party Status
As discussed in Part II.B, courts have distinguished between intended and
unintended recipients by analyzing manifestations of sender intent or
analyzing whether a communication reached its intended destination
uninterrupted.175 Some courts also subcategorize recipients based on the
recipient’s behavior; two subcategories include manufactured recipients176
and surreptitious listeners.177
1. Manufactured Recipients
Communications can begin when someone decides to speak,178 dials a
telephone,179 sends an email,180 or visits a website.181 Although this chain
of events is sufficient, the recipients of data can also direct a sender to initiate
the communication.182 This Note refers to these recipients as manufactured
recipients.

168. See Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(alluding to, but not citing, the Pasha line of thinking by describing an identical and
“untenable” hypothetical where “one who picks up a telephone” is subjected to liability).
169. See State v. Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1962) (providing the foundation for Pasha’s
paradigmatic view of interception).
170. 321 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 2014).
171. See id. (declining to extend Pasha to text messages).
172. Id. (“The sender addresses mail to a particular individual and reasonably expects the
communication to be routed to and received by the addressee.”).
173. See id.
174. See supra Part II.B.1.
175. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
176. See infra Part II.C.1.
177. See infra Part II.C.2.
178. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958–59 (Ill. 1994).
179. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964).
180. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2010).
181. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016); see
also Allen v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 9,
2018).
182. See infra notes 183–92 and accompanying text.
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For some courts, manufactured recipients are ineligible for the party
exception. In In re iPhone Application Litigation,183 a federal district court
in the Northern District of California considered a plaintiff-class’s allegation
that user data collected on iPhones and transmitted to Apple was unlawfully
intercepted.184 Apple invoked the party exception because iPhones were
intentionally designed to transmit user data to Apple.185 Apple argued that
because user data was intentionally sent to Apple, Apple was an intended
recipient and therefore an exempt party.186
On a motion to dismiss, the court rejected this argument.187 Apple’s
intentional software design was the very thing that allegedly enabled the
interception.188 Apple could not point to “accused conduct” as evidence that
it was an intended recipient eligible for a party exception.189 Likewise, in
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,190 New Jersey’s federal district
court rejected the party exception—where televisions transmitted users’
viewing habits—based on the defendant’s intentional software design.191
This intentional software design supported alleged wiretap interception and
could not create an intended recipient on a motion to dismiss.192
2. Surreptitious Listeners
Courts have recognized a second subcategory of recipients ineligible for
the party exception: surreptitious listeners.193 Pasha imagined unlawful
interception as the hypothetical conversation between two parties overheard
surreptitiously by a third entity.194 Interpreting this dicta, the federal district
court in New Jersey, in United States v. Eady,195 held that a person invisibly
listening to a conversation was ineligible for the party exception.196
However, not every surreptitious act creates a surreptitious listener ineligible
for the party exception.197 In Allen, the invisible transfer of user data by

183. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
184. Id. at 1050 (describing Apple’s alleged collection of geolocation data from users’
iPhones).
185. Id. at 1062.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (“Apple cannot manufacture a statutory exception through its own accused
conduct . . . .”).
190. No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2019).
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id.
193. See White, 2019 WL 8886485, at *6; Zak v. Bose Corp., No. 17-CV-02928, 2019 WL
1437909, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019); Allen v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 17-12352, 2018
WL 5874088, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018); Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL
1156328, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018).
194. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964).
195. No. 14-277, 2015 WL 1735495 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015).
196. See id. at *3.
197. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 144 n.80
(3d Cir. 2015).

970

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Quicken was insignificant.198 No matter how surreptitious, Quicken was
already an intended recipient of the communication and could freely transfer
the user data surreptitiously.199
For that reason, a surreptitious listener must intrude upon a communication
that could exist without the surreptitious listener’s participation.200 This
standard is met when a court identifies the sender and intended recipient and
then determines that the surreptitious listener fits into neither category.201
D. Party Status Also Depends on the Scope of a Communication
For all the work courts do to identify the parties to a communication,
sometimes analyzing the right communications is what matters most. In
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the New Jersey federal district
court was confronted with two communications each with different
identifiable parties.202 The first communication was between television users
and content providers, including video streaming services like Netflix.203
Here, users requested videos from their televisions by directing the
televisions to communicate with the content providers.204
In the second communication, Samsung’s embedded software in the users’
televisions created a transmission between users and Samsung’s servers.205
The second communication allegedly sent Samsung data about the videos
users requested from the content providers.206 Viewed in isolation, Samsung
was a party to the second communication sent directly from the users to
Samsung.207
However, the court rejected this isolated analysis.208 Taken together, the
second communication could be evidence that the first communication
between users and content providers was being intercepted and sent to
Samsung.209 The second communication conveyed to Samsung the duplicate
data contained in a communication between users and content providers; user
viewing habits sent from user to content provider.210 Party status in a second
communication could not protect Samsung if a second communication
198. See 2018 WL 5874088, at *5 (concluding that once Quicken was a party to the
communication, consent allowed Quicken to facilitate interception even if the behavior was
unknown to its users).
199. Id.
200. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *6 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019) (finding party status unavailing where surreptitious software intercepted
transmissions between content providers and customers’ TVs).
201. See id.
202. See id. at *5.
203. See id. at *1, *5.
204. See id.
205. See id. at *6.
206. See id. at *1.
207. See id. at *5.
208. See id. at *6.
209. See id. at *5.
210. Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants surreptitiously installed software on their
televisions that permitted Defendants to track their communications with streaming services,
their cable providers, or other content providers . . . .”).
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intercepted data in a communication between users and content providers
which Samsung was not a party to.211
As a result, litigants and courts can determine whether party status in one
communication is dispositive or distracting from another communication that
should decide liability.212 Similarly, a federal district court in the Northern
District of California, in In re iPhone Application Litigation, rejected Apple’s
focus on communications sent directly from users’ iPhones to Apple.213
Looking at these communications in isolation could suggest that Apple was
an intended recipient.214 Instead, the court widened the scope of its analysis
and asked whether Apple was a party to earlier, but related, communications
sent between users’ iPhones and cellular towers.215
III. THIRD AND NINTH CIRCUITS REACH OPPOSITE RESULTS ON THE PARTY
EXCEPTION IN REGARD TO DUPLICATE GET REQUESTS
Part III examines how the Third and Ninth Circuits applied the party
exception to a duplicate GET request. Part III.A considers the Third Circuit
case, In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy,216 in which the
Third Circuit concluded that the party exception applied to a duplicate GET
request.217 Part III.B highlights decisions in the First, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, which create a circuit split with the Third Circuit. Part III.B.1
analyzes cases in the First and Seventh Circuits where the courts concluded
that two communications containing duplicate data are indicia of wiretap
interception.218 Part III.B.2 reviews the Ninth Circuit decision, In re
Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation,219 which held that the party
exception did not apply to a duplicate GET request.220
A. Third Circuit: Digital Advertisers Are Exempt Parties
In 2015, the Third Circuit considered the wiretap liability of digital
advertisers, including Google.221 A class of plaintiffs sued for the alleged
211. See id. at *5 (“[W]hile Defendants are parties to the latter communication, it is the
former that Plaintiffs allege was unlawfully intercepted. Because Defendants are not a party
to that communication, the exception does not apply.”).
212. Compare In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 844 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (holding that lack of party status in an identical but standalone communication does not
deprive party status in a second communication), with Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937,
2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018) (holding that a communication from a user
to a recipient was relevant insofar as it intercepted another communication).
213. See id. at 1062 (rejecting Apple’s isolated focus on a single communication flowing
directly between the users’ iPhones and Apple’s servers).
214. Id.
215. Id. (finding that the relevant communication flowed from users’ iPhones to cellular
towers before the alleged interception).
216. 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).
217. See id. at 142–43.
218. See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010); In re
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
219. 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
220. Id. at 608.
221. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 130, 133.
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interception of their electronic communications.222 The suits were
consolidated into In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy
Litigation. The plaintiff-class represented the sort of internet users
mentioned throughout this Note.223 Users visited websites delivered via GET
requests.224
On arrival, websites displayed advertisements.225
Advertisements were served via a duplicate GET request generated when
users reached a website.226 The request was duplicate insofar as it contained
data identical to that found in the original request between user and
website.227 Advertisers retained user data and assigned an identity to track
users’ online behavior.228
On appeal, the internet users challenged the district court’s dismissal of
the wiretap interception claim.229 Contrary to the district court,230 the Third
Circuit found that the digital advertiser’s wiretap liability turned on whether
or not the advertisers were exempt parties.231 The digital advertisers argued
that they were intended recipients of the GET request communication and
thus qualified for the party exception.232
Like White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and In re iPhone
Application Litigation, the Third Circuit began its party exception analysis
by asking which communication controlled the digital advertisers’ party
status.233 In the internet users’ view, advertisers intercepted communications
between users and the websites they visited (e.g., the GET request from users
to website).234 The Third Circuit disagreed, isolating its analysis to the
duplicate GET request between users and advertisers.235
The court supported its conclusion with three points. First, the duplicate
GET request used to serve digital advertisements and collect user data flowed
directly from the users’ web browsers to the advertisers.236 This duplicate

222. See id.
223. See generally In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016);
Allen v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018).
224. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 130 (describing the GET request delivering a website to
users and the subsequent secondary GET request used to deliver digital advertisements to
users).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 130–31.
227. See id. at 140–41 (inferring that there was no need to obtain user data from a GET
request between users and websites because the same user data was contained within the
secondary GET request).
228. See id. at 131.
229. Id. at 134.
230. See id. at 139–40 (finding that the district court erred in finding that GET requests did
not contain identifiable content).
231. See id.
232. Id. at 140.
233. See id.; White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5
(D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2019); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
234. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140.
235. See id. at 142.
236. Id. at 140–41.
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GET request was not acquired on its way from users to websites.237 Second,
direct receipt of the duplicate GET request meant that the advertisers had “no
need” to capture identical data from the first GET request between the users
and the websites.238 Advertisers had the “information . . . anyway” from the
duplicate GET request.239 Third, the court found that the internet users had
not identified a device that could intercept the users’ first GET request.240
Once the court concluded that the relevant communication flowed directly
from the users to advertisers, the court proceeded to identify the parties to
that communication.241 In line with the sender and recipient framework, the
court concluded that any communication includes a sender and one or more
intended recipients.242 By making up the second half of the communication,
an intended recipient is an exempt party.243
Applying this logic, digital advertisers were the intended recipients of the
duplicate GET request because the requests were transmitted directly to
advertisers.244 This is similar to the logic applied in Pasha.245 The duplicate
GET request was intended to reach the advertisers’ servers and it reached that
destination uninterrupted.246 Accordingly, the advertisers were exempt
parties.247 At this point, even if the digital advertisers surreptitiously stored
data, they did so as exempt parties.248
The fact that Google was a manufactured recipient was also deemed
legally insignificant.249 Google’s embedded code “circumvented” a web
browser’s settings in order to generate the duplicate GET request.250 The
court held that Google’s behavior could manufacture recipient status by
gaining “entrance to a conversation through a fraud” without limiting
Google’s access to the party exception once the transmission occurred.251

237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 141.
240. Id. at 141–42.
241. Id. at 142–43.
242. Id. at 143.
243. See id. (“[T]he intended recipient of a communication is necessarily one of its
parties . . . .”).
244. See id. at 142.
245. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting State v.
Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 26 (N.J. 1962)).
246. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140 (characterizing the GET request as a direct
transmission from users to advertisers).
247. Id. at 145.
248. Id. at 143.
249. See id. (“Though we are no doubt troubled by the various deceits alleged in the
complaint, we do not agree that a deceit upon the sender affects the presumptive
non-liability . . . .”).
250. Id. at 132.
251. Id. at 143.
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B. A GET Request Circuit Split: The First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
Disagree with the Third Circuit
Part III.B.1 examines two First and Seventh Circuit decisions important to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking
Litigation. The First and Seventh Circuit decisions held that two
communications containing duplicate data are indicia of wiretap interception.
Part III.B.2 considers how the Ninth Circuit relied on this logic, rejected the
Third Circuit approach, and concluded that duplicate GET requests are
ineligible for a party exception.
1. First and Seventh Circuits: Duplicate Communications Are Indicia of
Wiretap Interception
By the time the Third Circuit accorded digital advertisers party status in
relation to their duplicate GET requests, the First and Seventh Circuits had
already set out doctrine for a contrary approach.252 In the First Circuit, the
court considered whether one communication should be analyzed in isolation
even though it contained duplicate data from another communication.253
Isolated, the communication containing duplicate data could grant
defendants status as an exempt party so long as they were intended
recipients—just as it would in the Third Circuit.254
This is precisely what Pharmatrak argued in the First Circuit’s 2003 case,
In re Pharmatrak, Inc.255 Pharmatrak sold software to pharmaceutical
clients, allowing the clients to track users’ behavior on the clients’
websites.256 Unknown to the clients and users alike, Pharmatrak collected
user data in a variety of ways.257 In one instance, Pharmatrak duplicated the
data from communications sent from users’ web browsers to the client
websites.258 User data was then sent back to Pharmatrak using a second
communication.259 Pharmatrak argued that these were two unique
communications: one communication between users and client websites, and
a second communication between users and Pharmatrak.260
The First Circuit rejected this argument. Notably, the user data captured
by Pharmatrak was identical to the data generated in the original
communication between users and the clients’ websites.261 The court noted
252. See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010); In re
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
253. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22.
254. See id.; see supra notes 244–47 and accompanying text.
255. 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
256. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 22 (“[C]ode automatically duplicated part of the communication between a user
and a . . . client and sent this information to a third party . . . .”).
259. Id.
260. Id. (“Pharmatrak argues that there was no interception because ‘there were always two
separate communications: one between the Web user and the Pharmaceutical Client, and the
other between the Web user and Pharmatrak.’”).
261. See id.
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that unauthorized interception under the Wiretap Act did not require
acquisition of the “same communication”—only a communication’s
contents.262 For the First Circuit, this established wiretap liability.263 It was
enough to intercept a communication’s contents even if the contents were
transmitted using a second communication.264
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Szymuszkiewicz confirmed that wiretap interception could include multiple
communications tied together because the communications’ contents were
duplicate. Szymuszkiewicz allegedly spied on Infusino by tampering with
Infusino’s email settings so that Infusino’s emails were automatically
forwarded from Infusino’s inbox to Szymuszkiewicz’s computer.265 This
meant that there were two communications containing duplicate data: emails
Infusino received and duplicate emails forwarded from Infusino to
Szymuszkiewicz.266
According to Szymuszkiewicz, there was no
interception because the emails were forwarded once Infusino received them,
not while the emails were in transit.267
The Seventh Circuit declined to require in-transit interception of the emails
Infusino received.268 The court held that from a technical perspective,
in-transit interception was impossible because there was never a single
communication while the emails were transmitted to Infusino.269 Emails are
split up into multiple communications and only reassembled once they reach
their intended recipient.270 Szymuszkiewicz could only acquire the emails
by duplicating and forwarding the contents.271 Thus, a second transmission
containing the same data as another communication was a necessary element
of wiretap interception.272
2. Ninth Circuit: Digital Advertisers Are Not Exempt Parties
The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the Third Circuit’s holding.273
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, recipients of a duplicate GET request containing
the same data as another GET request were not exempt parties.274 In In re
262. See id. (“[C]ircuits . . . do not require that the acquisition somehow constitute the same
communication . . . .”).
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2010).
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 705.
269. Id. (“‘[I]nterception’ as ‘catching a thing in flight’ is sensible enough for football, but
for email there is no single ‘thing’ . . . .”) (quoting Brief and Appendix of
Defendant-Appellant David S. Szymuszkiewicz at *1, United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622
F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1347)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 706 (“‘[I]nterception’ of a communication sent in packets must be done by
programming a computer to copy the contents it sends along . . . .”).
272. See id.
273. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020).
274. Id. (“[S]imultaneous, unknown duplication and communication of GET requests do
not exempt a defendant from liability . . . .”).
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Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, internet users sued Facebook for
the alleged interception of the users’ GET request data sent to websites.275
Facebook embedded plug-ins on websites on the internet.276 These
plug-ins allowed internet users to “like” content on the website.277 The
plug-ins also collected user data including URLs of the websites the users
visited, referral information indicating the websites that users last visited, and
search query terms.278 Facebook retained and identified this user data.279
At a technical level, Facebook’s collection of user data leveraged GET
requests.280 When users visited a website, an initial GET request was
generated between the users and the websites containing user data.281
Simultaneously, the Facebook plug-in generated a duplicate GET request
between the users and Facebook.282 This duplicate contained the same user
data that appeared in the GET request sent from users to the websites.283
In assessing this fact pattern, the lower court had held that the party
exception did not apply.284 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
decisions in In re Pharmatrak and Szymuszkiewicz.285 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted both cases as punishing surreptitious listeners.286 The Ninth
Circuit also noted that both In re Pharmatrak and Szymuszkiewicz identified
wiretap interception where two communications contained duplicate data
shared between more than one communication.287 There was also duplicate
data here.288 Facebook’s GET request contained the same user data as the
GET request sent from the internet users to websites that contained
Facebook’s plug-in.289
The Ninth Circuit then concluded that a surreptitious GET request
containing duplicate user data from another GET request could not accord
party status.290 The court relied heavily on legislative intent to buttress the
First and Seventh Circuits’ persuasive decisions.291 The Ninth Circuit
275. See id. at 596.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 607 (“[C]ode directs the user’s browser to copy the referer [sic] header from
the GET request and then send a separate but identical GET request . . . to Facebook’s
server.”).
281. Id. at 605, 607.
282. Id. at 607.
283. Id.
284. In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
285. In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607.
286. Id. (“The First and Seventh Circuits have implicitly assumed that entities that
surreptitiously duplicate transmissions between two parties are not parties to
communications . . . .”).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 608.
291. Id. (affirming that the Wiretap Act was intended to protect the privacy of
communications and that the legislative history “evidences Congress’s intent to prevent the
acquisition of the contents of a message by an unauthorized third-party”).
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interpreted the Wiretap Act as prohibiting the acquisition of communications
by surreptitious listeners hidden from the lawful parties to a
communication.292 Using legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit held that
allowing Facebook to invoke the party exception would allow frequent and
unknown collection of user data.293 For the Ninth Circuit, this was an
exception that swallowed the rule.294
IV. DIGITAL ADVERTISERS ARE UNINTENDED RECIPIENTS AND INELIGIBLE
FOR THE PARTY EXCEPTION
Part IV argues that when digital advertisers receive a duplicate GET
request, they are unintended recipients ineligible for the party exception. Part
IV.A contends that when two GET requests contain duplicate data, the
duplicate data should be the focus of a court’s party analysis. Part IV.B notes
that when two communications contain duplicate data, equating the direct
recipient of a GET request with an intended recipient lacks judicial support
and cannot properly decide party status. Part IV.C concludes that when the
GET requests’ duplicate data is analyzed, digital advertisers are unintended
recipients of that user data. Part IV.C.1 confirms this by analyzing the
manifestations of sender intent. Part IV.C.2 reaches the same conclusion by
analyzing the user data’s intended destination.
A. Duplicate GET Requests Create a Possibility of Interception
In re Google’s facts presented the Third Circuit with two GET requests.
One was between users and the websites they visited.295 The other was
between internet users and digital advertisers.296 These GET requests were
duplicate insofar as they shared the same user data.297 Users in the Third
Circuit argued that advertisers intercepted data in the GET request between
users and websites.298 However, the court rejected this theory and instead
isolated its wiretap interception analysis to the GET request between users
and digital advertisers.299 Isolating the analysis to only one GET request and
its data was improper because it misconstrues how user data is intercepted.
When two communications contain the same user data, courts routinely
factor this into their analysis. In Vasil, the defendant received a
communication that conveyed user data from another communication
between users and a mobile application.300 The defendant in In re iPhone
292. Id. (“[L]egislative history evidences Congress’s intent to prevent the acquisition of
the contents of a message by an unauthorized third-party or ‘an unseen auditor.’”).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir.
2015).
296. Id.
297. See id. at 140.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 142.
300. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018).
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received a communication that contained user data from another
communication between the users’ iPhones and cellular towers.301
Samsung’s communication in White conveyed users’ television viewing data,
all of which was contained in another communication between the users and
content providers.302 The communication in In re Pharmatrak conveyed user
data that also appeared in another communication between users and
websites.303 Each decision found support for interception and held that the
party exception did not apply.304
These courts correctly analyzed both duplicate communications and the
duplicate data because it is the smoking gun of unlawful interception.
Szymuszkiewicz recognized that a second communication can be necessary in
order to intercept certain user data.305 Emails are broken up into packets of
information and sent using many different communications.306 In order to
intercept an email broken up into packets, a second communication must
duplicate and transmit the contents.307 Other user data is broken up into
packets of information.308 This can include the GET request exchange.309
Accordingly, the same logic can apply to GET requests. User data in a GET
request may be intercepted by duplicating the contents of one GET request
and transmitting that data using a second communication. This means that
intercepting a GET request may involve the use of a second
communication.310 Intercepting GET requests may appear different than
recording an oral conversation311 or wiretapping a telephone line,312 but it is
still a potential form of interception.313
Not every GET request necessarily relies on multiple packets to transmit
the initial user data—far from it. The transmission of user data via a GET

301. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
302. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. CV 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *1, *5
(D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2019).
303. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2003).
304. See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text.
305. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2010).
306. Id. at 705.
307. Id. at 706 (“The ‘interception’ of a communication sent in packets must be done by
programming a computer to copy the contents it sends along (and reassemble them
later) . . . .”).
308. Packets, NETWORKS LAND (Oct. 21, 2020), http://networks.land/reference/packets/
[https://perma.cc/L6ZT-GSBX] (“Packets are the basic unit of transport for digital
communications networks.”).
309. Pamela Fox, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), KHAN ACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computers-and-internet/xcae6f4a7ff015e7d:theinternet/xcae6f4a7ff015e7d:web-protocols/a/hypertext-transfer-protocol-http
[https://perma.cc/3Q77-BTNH] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
310. Even if this is not a necessary method for intercepting GET requests, Szymuszkiewicz
and In re Pharmatrak suggest that it is sufficient. See supra Part III.B.1. With that in mind,
courts should analyze the GET requests together because there is the possibility one GET
request intercepts another request’s data.
311. See generally Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
312. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (requiring interception
while a communication is in transit).
313. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
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request may only use a single packet.314 In fact, the total exchange should
include as few packets as possible.315 That said, the response to a GET
request may generate many packets to transmit website content.316
Even so, cookies identifying user data can increase the size of an initial
GET request’s data, thus employing additional packets for the
transmission.317 Particular senders, recipients, or pathways between senders
and recipients may warrant additional packets.318 Accordingly, second
communications remain an effective method of capturing user data where
there is uncertainty as to whether data in the first communication will be
found within a single easily intercepted transmission.319 Furthermore, GET
requests may be sent using HTTPS connections, in which case the user data
in the GET request is encrypted.320 At that point, a duplicate GET request
may not only be an effective method of interception, but a necessary one.
As a result, the Third Circuit was quick to exclude the GET request
between users and websites.321 The GET request digital advertisers received
could contain the data of a GET request between users and websites because
that data was intercepted. When user data is shared between two GET
requests, this is not evidence that interception is unnecessary;322 it is
evidence that interception may have occurred.323 The Third Circuit also
erred when it did not identify a device “capable of capturing” the GET
requests between users and websites.324 The GET request that advertisers
receive is the answer. The duplicate GET request is an “artifice” that not
314. See Fox, supra note 309 (contemplating an HTTP request, which can include a GET
request, contained within a single packet).
315. See HTTP/2 Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE,
https://http2.github.io/faq [https://perma.cc/F8Y8-B3ZB] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021)
(advocating for the compression of data to reduce the number of requests and speed up
websites).
316. See Fox, supra note 309 (“[E]ach HTTP response [versus the HTTP request] is inside
another IP packet—or more typically, multiple packets, since the response data can be quite
large.”).
317. An Analysis of Cookie Sizes on the Web, PAUL CALVANO (July 13, 2020),
https://paulcalvano.com/2020-07-13-an-analysis-of-cookie-sizes-on-the-web
[https://perma.cc/Z99D-86ZF] (examining how the size of cookies can dictate whether
“multiple TCP packets” are used in an HTTP request, including GET requests).
318. See
Maximum
Packet
Size,
IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/ztpf/
1.1.0.15?topic=addresses-maximum-packet-size [https://perma.cc/8DLN-Z3PJ] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021) (describing how a client, server, and network can have varying maximum
packet sizes resulting in the use of additional packets if data exceeds the maximum packet
size).
319. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that when packets are in use in the transmission of data, the underlying data must then be
copied).
320. See Introduction to HTTPS, CIO COUNCIL, https://https.cio.gov/faq
[https://perma.cc/7WDA-VM4Z] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
321. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 142 (3d Cir.
2015) (isolating the exception analysis).
322. Id. at 140–41 (“[T]here is no need . . . to acquire that information from [other]
transmissions . . . [T]he defendants would have the information at issue anyway.”).
323. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Szymuszkiewicz,
622 F.3d at 706.
324. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 141–42.
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only displays digital advertisements but also, by its function, redirects
duplicate data between the user and the website.325
The Third Circuit should have asked whether the two GET requests were
so interrelated that they create the possibility of interception. If so, the court
should have assessed whether the advertiser was an intended recipient of that
duplicate data. Focusing on the data recognizes that interception can occur
when data is duplicated, even if that process requires a second GET
request.326 Otherwise, the court turns a blind eye to a common method of
interception: duplicating user data and transmitting it using a second
communication.327 The Wiretap Act’s party exception protects parties to a
communication.328 The party exception does not protect novel forms of
interception.329
The GET request between users and advertisers qualifies as the sort of
communication that should be analyzed in terms of duplicate data. First, the
GET request that advertisers receive contains duplicate data found in another
GET request.330 A GET request containing duplicate data from another GET
request mirrors the communications in Vasil, In re iPhone, White, In re
Pharmatrak, and Szymuszkiewicz, where one communication contained the
same data as another communication creating the risk that the data was
obtained by interception.331 As such, two GET requests containing duplicate
data should be analyzed in terms of the data’s intended recipient because that
duplicate data may indicate that it was likewise obtained by interception.332
Second, the advertisers’ duplicate GET request is automatically generated
when the GET request between users and websites is created.333 This is what
Szymuszkiewicz interception would expect—affirming the risk that the
duplicate data is being intercepted using a second GET request. One
communication’s content is being intercepted using a second
communication; an effective, or even necessary, method of interception for

325. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018).
326. In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (concluding that wiretap interception does not
require the interception of the same communication and that two duplicate communications
are sufficient).
327. See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706.
328. Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475 (Ct. App. 1979); see supra note 41 and
accompanying text (confirming that Warden’s state law interpretation is equivalent to the
federal law exception).
329. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706; Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (declining to reward
tech savvy wiretappers); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (“Apple cannot manufacture a statutory exception . . . .”).
330. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that the “like” button “is able to replicate [user data].”); In re Google Inc. Cookie
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 2015).
331. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text.
332. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019).
333. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 130; see also In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607.
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data.334 When the Third Circuit declined to analyze the intended recipient of
the duplicate data, the court ignored an indicium of interception.335
B. Direct Receipt of GET Requests Cannot Decide Party Status
After too quickly isolating its analysis, the Third Circuit equated the direct
recipient of a duplicate GET request with an intended recipient.336 This
standard is inconsistent with case law and cannot accurately decide party
status for GET requests that share data. Case law indicates that the
interception of data appears deceptively direct—from user to alleged
wrongdoer.
In Vasil, the communication flowed directly from the users’ phones to
Vasil’s servers.337 Although Vasil applied Illinois state law, the court noted
that the Illinois definition of a party “comports” with the federal definition.338
The court held that federal law does not equate direct and intended
recipients.339 Likewise, In re iPhone involved an intentional transmission
sent directly from “mobile devices to Apple’s servers.”340 The court declined
to apply the party exception.341 The Third Circuit is not bound by either legal
decision. Yet, both courts were confronted with direct recipients and did not
find that factor valuable in deciding exempt party status.
It is possible that the Third Circuit has found some value in equating direct
receipt with an intended recipient that lower courts have not. That said, New
Jersey federal district court’s decision in White and a subsequent reading of
White in New Concepts for Living, Inc. v. Communications Workers Local
1040342 may demonstrate the limited value of the standard for electronic
communications.
In White, the court rejected Samsung’s argument that relevant
communications “were transmissions from Plaintiffs’ Smart TVs to
[Samsung’s] servers,” which—if Samsung had been correct—would imply
that the communications were “directly received” by Samsung and exempt
according to a direct receipt standard.343
Rather, the court in New Concepts for Living, Inc. read White as describing
“allegedly captured transmissions that were not being directly sent to
[Samsung].”344 For this reason, White can be viewed as a case of a liable
indirect recipient, and In re Google can be viewed as a case of a direct
334. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text.
336. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140–42.
337. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018).
338. Id.
339. See id. at *7.
340. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
341. See id.
342. No. 19-719, 2021 WL 2201835 (D.N.J. May 28, 2021).
343. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019) (rejecting Samsung’s characterization, while noting that In re Google granted
party status where Google “directly received their communications”).
344. See New Concepts for Living, Inc., 2021 WL 2201835, at *5.
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recipient treated as an intended recipient.345 The trouble is that both White
and In re Google describe alleged interception by indirect recipients no
matter the fact that some underlying communications appear deceptively
direct as they move from users to the defendants of each case.
In White, Samsung was an indirect recipient because Samsung allegedly
monitored communications between users’ television and content providers
before receiving a second communication from “the Smart TV[s] to
[Samsung’s] servers.”346 Despite the fact that Samsung was a party “to the
latter communication” sent from users to Samsung, Samsung was not a direct
recipient so long as the alleged interception began with a communication
between the users’ televisions and the content providers.347 Receipt and
party status in the second communication was not enough so long as alleged
interception began with the first communication.348
Yet, the GET request that an alleged wrongdoer typically receives takes an
equally attenuated path—deceptively direct—from user to defendant. Popa
v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc.,349 in the Western District of Pennsylvania,
examined the movement of a GET request from user to defendant—
Navistone—while relying on In re Google’s application of the direct
recipient standard for party status.350 Despite concluding that Navistone was
“a direct party” to the GET request received, that communication first relied
on a transmission between user and website: “[t]he visitor’s browser first
sends a GET request to [the website’s] server, and that server responds,”
which only then prompts the additional GET requests transmitted toward
Navistone.351
In this way, In re Google and Popa both describe a GET request moving
from user to defendant prompted only by virtue of an earlier communication
between the user and the website.352 Like in White, however direct a
defendant’s receipt of a GET request appears, alleged interception begins by
relying on an initial communication between two other parties that does not
include the defendant. In White, Samsung relied on communications

345. See id. (distinguishing White from In re Google by concluding that White included
“captured transmissions that were not being directly sent to [Samsung],” while In re Google
“involved direct receipt by those defendants of the relevant communications”).
346. White, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. No. 2:19-CV-450, 2021 WL 2463304 (W.D. Pa. June 17, 2021).
350. Id. at *7–8 (“The processes and operations underlying the communications between a
user’s web browser, Harriet Carter’s website server, and Navistone’s servers are materially
similar to those discussed in In re Google.”). Popa decides a state law claim. However, the
court concluded that Pennsylvania law is equivalent to the Wiretap Act. Id. at *6.
351. See id. at *7–8.
352. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 140
(3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the GET request from a user to a digital advertiser is prompted by
an earlier GET request exchange between a user and a website); see also id. at *7 (noting
visitors send an initial GET request to the website before the server prompts GET requests
sent to the defendant).
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between users and content providers.353 In Popa and In re Google,
defendants relied on GET requests between users and websites.354 Receiving
a communication dependent on another transmission—all the while sharing
that earlier transmission’s data—means that a defendant’s communication is
the indirect result of a former communication that defendants “are not a party
to” and not merely a communication “directly received.”355
Notwithstanding the trouble identifying bona fide direct receipt of
electronic communications reliant on other transmissions, the Third Circuit’s
interest in direct recipients may arise from Pasha’s interpretation of intended
recipients. The court cited Pasha in an unrelated analysis.356 In Pasha, the
court analyzed whether a communication reached its intended destination
uninterrupted.357 This was one way to distinguish intended and unintended
recipients.358 However, the Third Circuit’s reasoning suggests that any direct
recipient of a communication is an intended recipient.359 This interpretation
appears inconsistent with Pasha. The Third Circuit focused on whether a
GET request reached its destination directly but did not ask if the GET
request had reached its “destined place.”360
This suggests that the Third Circuit’s reasoning either misinterprets Pasha
or lacks judicial support. If the Third Circuit created a new standard, it
cannot properly decide party status for duplicate GET requests. Under this
standard, a court would ask if a GET request reached a destination
uninterrupted without deciding if the GET request reached an intended
destination.361 If there is only one GET request, and one recipient to analyze,
this standard makes sense. Every protected communication includes at least
one sender and one recipient.362 Otherwise, no communication exists to
begin with.363 If a plaintiff can only identify one communication and one
recipient, then that recipient must have been intended.364
In this situation, identifying a direct recipient is useful because interception
requires at least three entities: (1) a lawful sender, (2) an intended recipient,
and (3) an unintended recipient that is tampering with the communication.365
353. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019).
354. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
355. See White, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5–6; see also supra Part IV.A (describing the
possibility of Szymuszkiewicz interception where two electronic communications share the
same underlying data).
356. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143–44
(3d Cir. 2015).
357. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964).
358. See supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
359. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 142.
360. Pasha, 332 F.2d at 198 (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)).
361. See supra notes 359–60 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
364. See Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(concluding that the only identifiable recipient was a party when there was no evidence of
tampering).
365. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text.
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Here, the unintended recipient tampers with the underlying communication
so that it no longer reaches its intended destination uninterrupted.366 If there
is only one possible recipient and one identifiable communication, a direct
recipient could not have tampered with the communication.367 The
communication had nowhere else to go.368 By default, the direct recipient
becomes the communication’s intended recipient and a lawful party.369
For duplicate GET requests, the direct recipient of a single GET request
says little. Here, there are two recipients: websites users visit and
advertisers.370 A court must identify the intended recipients of the data
because one communication could intercept the data from another
communication.371 In this case, digital advertisers are direct recipients of a
GET request, but the GET request may still leverage another GET request by
duplicating user data between users and websites.372
As a result, the direct recipient of a duplicate GET request is equally
consistent with the three-entity requirement of a surreptitious listener.373
When a user sends a GET request, websites are intended recipients, and
advertisers receive a duplicate GET request to eavesdrop on users and
websites as the third entity in the exchange.374 When duplicate GET requests
can be evidence of interception, even the direct recipients thereof could be
intercepting data.375 A court must analyze whether advertisers are intended
recipients of the duplicate data, not whether advertisers are direct recipients
of the suspect data.
C. Digital Advertisers Are Ineligible for the Party Exception
Part IV.C concludes that digital advertisers are unintended recipients of
duplicate user data shared by two GET requests. Part IV.C adopts two
methods for distinguishing intended and unintended recipients. Part IV.C.1
assesses manifestations of sender intent when internet users communicate
366. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)).
367. Contrast this with a surreptitious listener who intrudes upon a communication between
two parties: a sender and an intended recipient. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying
text.
368. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (“[I]f there was an ‘electronic communication’ here, Defendant was
a party to it.”).
369. See id.
370. See supra notes 224–26, 281–83 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part IV.A.
372. See supra notes 321–35 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text.
374. Once a duplicate communication is seen as an indicium of interception, that may
enable a court to conclude that the party exception should not apply. See supra notes 300–25
and accompanying text. However, under an intended recipient analysis, a court will still need
to confirm that the defendant was not the intended recipient of the duplicate communication’s
data by going on to assess either manifestations of sender intent or the intended destination.
See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. But now the analysis must focus on the duplicate data (i.e., the
content being allegedly intercepted). See supra Part IV.A.
375. See supra notes 300–25 and accompanying text.
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data in GET requests. Part IV.C.2 considers the intended destination of GET
requests’ data. Using either approach, advertisers are unintended recipients
ineligible for the party exception.
1. Manifestations of Sender Intent and GET Request Data
Internet users manifest the intent to send user data to websites, not to
digital advertisers. In Backhaut and Roden the manifestations of sender
intent were explicit.376 Cellphone users addressed text messages to a
particular recipient.377 In Roden, the court accepted a sender’s reasonable
expectation that a text message would reach the identified recipient, not
someone else.378 The same explicit manifestations of intent appear in GET
requests; that intent does not include transmission to digital advertisers.
Here, an internet users’ web browsers navigate the internet via GET
requests.379 Internet users make it clear that they want to communicate with
a particular website when they enter a website’s URL or click on a website’s
link.380 But any intent to communicate with advertisers is difficult to locate.
Unlike entering a URL or clicking a link, a duplicate GET request is
generated automatically in a process invisible to users.381
It is illogical to say that users explicitly intend to communicate data with
digital advertisers when the transfer of the user data happens without the
users’ involvement and is hidden from the users’ view.382 Furthermore,
when advertisers gain access to data invisibly, they become surreptitious
listeners that the Wiretap Act punishes, not exempt parties that the Wiretap
Act should absolve.383
However, Vasil might allow a court to infer an intent to communicate with
digital advertisers. The court inferred intent based on how users expect
phones to communicate data based on privacy settings.384 Roden was also
376. See Backhaut v. Apple, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014); State v. Roden,
321 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Wash. 2014).
377. See Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189 (“[S]ending a text is more like mailing a letter. The
sender addresses mail to a particular individual and reasonably expects the communication to
be routed to and received by the addressee.”); see also Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1043–44
(concluding that plaintiff’s allegations that text messages were not “addressed or directed to
Apple” created a viable claim of interception on a motion to dismiss).
378. See Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189.
379. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 130
(3d Cir. 2015); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“When an individual internet user visits a web page, his or her browser sends a
message called a ‘GET request’ . . . .”).
380. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d, at 596 (quoting In re Zynga Priv. Litig., 750 F.3d 1098,
1101 (9th Cir. 2014)).
381. See id. (describing the GET process as “undetectable”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329
F.3d at 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing Pharmatrak’s use of GET requests and then
characterizing the process as “code that automatically duplicated part of the communication”).
382. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
383. United States v. Eady, No. 14-277, 2015 WL 1735495, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015).
384. See Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2018) (inferring the possible intended recipients based on the privacy settings a user could
select).
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interested in the reasonable expectations of a user.385 Internet users
understand that their electronic data is monetized.386 Advertisers commonly
monetize user data.387 In this way, internet users may reasonably expect to
communicate with advertisers when they navigate the internet.
But Vasil and Roden inferred intent to protect electronic communications,
not exempt defendants.388 A court may disfavor Wiretap Act interpretations
that create broad liability exceptions.389 A user cannot consent to
interception simply because the user knows interception is possible.390 This
would limit the Wiretap Act to uninformed plaintiffs. The Wiretap Act does
not exempt novel forms of interception.391 This would limit the Wiretap Act
to only the sort of interception a court has seen before. Courts should not
limit the Wiretap Act merely because internet users have grown to expect
advertisers on the internet. This would limit liability for the pervasive
eavesdropper.392
If there is any intent to generate a duplicate GET request, it comes from
digital advertisers, not internet users. Digital advertisers intend to
communicate with internet users when they embed code that will generate
the duplicate GET request.393 But recipient intent is not enough for the party
exception.394 Apple could not invoke the party exception because it designed
iPhones to transmit user data to Apple’s servers.395 Samsung could not
invoke the party exception because it developed software to transmit user
data directly from a user’s television to Samsung.396 Similarly, advertisers
should not be able to invoke the party exception because they intentionally
manufactured GET requests.

385. See State v. Roden, 321 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Wash. 2014).
386. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016)
(accepting that users understand that their data is not entirely private and that their data is
monetized).
387. See id.
388. See Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6; see also Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189 (concluding
that a user’s reasonable expectations do not include unaddressed recipients).
389. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020)
(disfavoring a statutory interpretation of parties that would allow the “exception to swallow
the rule”).
390. See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“[K]nowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered implied consent.”).
391. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
392. In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 589, 608 (“The unauthorized duplication and forwarding
of unknowing users’ information would render permissible the most common methods of
intrusion . . . .”).
393. See id. at 596.
394. See supra Part II.C.1.
395. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Apple
cannot manufacture a statutory exception through its own accused conduct . . . .”).
396. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *6 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2019) (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants surreptitiously installed software on their
televisions that permitted Defendants to track their communications . . . . Defendants’
argument that they were parties to these communications is unavailing.”).
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In sum, users only manifest clear intent to communicate with the websites
that the users visit via a URL or hyperlink.397 A court need not stretch to
find some other manifestation of sender intent where the intent is clear.
When users clearly intended to communicate with doctors, business
associates, or sexual partners, then a court did not search for other exempt
parties.398 Likewise, when websites are unambiguously users’ intended
recipients via a URL, advertisers receive duplicate GET requests as
unintended recipients because websites are the focus of sender intent. As
unintended recipients of the data in a GET request, advertisers are ineligible
for the party exception.399
2. Intended Destinations and GET Request Data
The court in Pasha decided whether a communication reached its
“destined place” uninterrupted.400 If so, the recipient was a party.401 If a
telephone call reached its intended telephone, anyone who answered the call
was a party.402 Corporations accessing communications intended for their
web servers are parties, too.403 An unintended recipient tampers with the
communication and redirects that communication to an unintended
destination in order to gain access.404 In Pasha, the intended destination was
explicit because a particular telephone number was dialed.405 In Jurgens and
Crowley, the intended destinations were implied because the
communications had nowhere else to go.406 These recipients merely
accessed communications that were sent to their servers.407 In Crowley this
ruled out tampering.408
Like Pasha’s telephone, the data in an internet user’s GET request has an
explicit intended destination. The intended destination does not include
397. See supra notes 380–83 and accompanying text.
398. See Lopez v. Apple, Inc., No. 19-04577, 2021 WL 823122, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
2021).
399. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
400. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)).
401. Id. (concluding that law enforcement had not intercepted the telephone conversations
by merely answering the telephone).
402. Id. (concluding that answering a telephone was not enough to create liability, while
identifying tampering as interception).
403. Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(concluding that the defendant had not engaged in wiretap interception where the defendant
“merely received the information transferred” to the defendant onto their server).
404. See Pasha, 332 F.2d at 198 (“[T]here was no tampering with the established means of
communication.” (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942))).
405. See id. at 196.
406. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *5–6 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (concluding that if there was a communication, then the defendant was a
party and that otherwise, there would be no communication); see also Crowley, 166 F. Supp.
2d at 1269 (“Amazon merely received the information transferred to it . . . an act without
which there would be no transfer. Amazon acted as . . . the second party . . . .”).
407. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
408. See Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (concluding that receiving an email was as
benign as answering a telephone).
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digital advertisers. Internet users visit a website by entering its URL or
clicking on a hyperlink.409 URLs and hyperlinks include the website’s
domain name (e.g., “nytimes.com”).410 Each domain name is assigned a
unique IP address identifying the location of the website and its content.411
An IP address is the internet’s equivalent of a telephone number.412 Entering
the URL or clicking on a hyperlink generates the GET request containing
user data that calls out to that IP address.413 A website’s servers are assigned
to the IP address and respond to the GET request with the website’s
content.414 Therefore, when users enter a URL or click on a hyperlink, they
identify a website as the intended destination.
But unlike Pasha, the GET request’s data reaches a second destination:
the server of a digital advertiser.415 Nothing in the initial URL or hyperlink
identifies digital advertisers’ servers as an intended destination. According
to Pasha, the GET request’s data should only reach its intended destination.
Pasha cannot help advertisers where GET request data reaches an intended
destination but also a second unexpected destination.416
This result still has all the attributes of an unintended recipient ineligible
for the party exception. First, digital advertisers embed the code to generate
a duplicate GET request with a second destination.417 Then, digital
advertisers are still acting like a manufactured recipient punished by
courts.418 Second, digital advertisers receive a second GET request with
duplicate data. This is still an indicator of Szymuszkiewicz interception.419
Third, digital advertisers engage in this conduct invisibly; courts punish the
surreptitious listener.420

409. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 605, 607 (9th Cir. 2020);
In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2015).
410. See Fox, supra note 309 (“We typically type nice human-friendly URLs into browsers,
like ‘khanacademy.org’ . . . .”).
411. See id. (“Those domain names map to IP addresses, the true location of the domain’s
computers.”).
412. What Is an IP Address?, GNOME HELP, https://help.gnome.org/users/gnomehelp/stable/net-what-is-ip-address.html.en [https://perma.cc/4BCE-N4LH] (last visited Sept.
17, 2021) (“An IP address is similar to [a] phone number . . . . [It] is a unique set of numbers
that identifies [a] computer so that it can send and receive data . . . .”).
413. See Fox, supra note 309.
414. See id.
415. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 605, 607 (9th Cir.
2020).
416. But see Kerr, supra note 26 (concluding that the intended destination case law that
exempts an unexpected party merely answering a telephone call is equivalent to “browser info
that gets routed to the third party”). This Note argues instead that duplicate GET requests are
more akin to a phone call reaching two destinations despite being intended for only one
destination. This Note readily concedes Kerr’s subsequent argument that the standalone
consent exception may exempt many defendants. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying
text.
417. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 130 (3d
Cir. 2015).
418. See supra notes 393–96 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
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Each of these factors should disqualify advertisers from invoking party
status. The intended destination of user data does not rebut this conclusion
because the only identifiable intended destination was a website identified by
an IP address.421 That being so, when a duplicate GET request’s data is sent
to an advertiser’s server, the advertiser is an unintended recipient.
Jurgens and Crowley offer no support for digital advertisers. There,
intended destinations were inferred because there was only one possible
recipient.422 Here, there is already an intended destination and it is the
website’s servers, not advertisers.423
With all the indications of
interception,424 and nothing to suggest advertisers’ servers were intended,425
courts can only conclude that advertisers’ servers were an unintended
destination. Advertisers are thus ineligible for a party exception.
CONCLUSION
User data can be intercepted by duplication and transmission of that data
using a second communication.426 It then follows that duplicate data in a
second GET request may indicate interception.427 Therefore, courts must
decide party status by analyzing the user data’s intended recipient by
assessing manifestations of sender intent or the user data’s intended
destination.428 The URLs and hyperlinks users employ to visit websites
identify the websites as the intended recipients of user data.429 The same
cannot be said for digital advertisers.430 Accordingly, digital advertisers are
unintended recipients and ineligible for the Wiretap Act’s party exception.
If interception on the internet is properly understood, the party exception
is unavailable for duplicate GET requests. This Note does not discount the
Ninth Circuit’s focus on legislative intent to reach the same result.431 This
Note also does not forget the power of consent to otherwise exempt wiretap

421. See supra notes 409–14 and accompanying text. Additionally, digital advertisers
cannot claim to be part of the destination website and benefit from that intended destination
given that advertisers act as “independent parties who [mine] information from other
websites” and are not the websites themselves. See Graham v. Noom, Inc., No. 20-CV-06903,
2021 WL 1312765, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (concluding that In re Facebook duplicate
GET requests were website-independent, whereas Graham’s defendant FullStory was an
extension of the website because the user data there was being collected on the website’s
behalf).
422. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *5 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2017); Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
423. See supra notes 409–14 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 417–20 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 409–14 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 305–07 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 308–35 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 336–75 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 379–80, 409–14 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 381–99, 415–25 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text.
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defendants.432 Still, examining how data is intercepted on the internet reveals
a cacophony of GET requests that are ineligible for the party exception.

432. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.

